Incentive reversal (IR) is when higher rewards induce some agents to reduce their effort (Winter, 2009) . We show that IR can hold for all agents when: there is an improvement in production technology; and rewards are based on team output. Whilst IR requires at least one worker's marginal return to be decreasing in team productivity when agents invest simultaneously, this is not necessary with sequential investments. Rather, IR can occur with sequential investment when the marginal return of effort for all agents is increasing with improvements in technology.
Introduction
For people working in a team, the incentive to work hard and put in effort depends on the environment they find themselves in. 1 At first glance, it might appear that the adoption of a productivity-enhancing technology would help elicit greater effort from agents; this is, in fact, not always the case. In this paper we study how an improvement in a team's productivity influences individuals' investment incentives.
Adopting the model of Mai et al. (2014) , we examine individual effort incentives when payoffs (rewards) depend on team output,à la Holmstrom (1982) . Specifically, we show that agents might have an incentive to reduce their effort as the team itself becomes more productive. This result draws on the model of Winter (2009) , who shows that incentive reversal (hereafter IR) -the situation when greater rewards induce lower effort from some agents -can occur when a larger payoff induces one agent to always invest, which in turn creates an incentive for other agents to free ride. 2 Here, we extend his analysis by allowing for both simultaneous and sequential investment. In this way, our model illustrates that IR can occur in a broader range of contexts than previously considered. Moreover, in our set-up IR can hold for all the team members, not just some of the agents as in Winter (2009) . Following Mai et al. (2014) , consider an incomplete-contracting model with two agents, A 1 and A 2 . Each agent can expend some specific effort e i ∈ [0, e i ) 3 , for i = 1, 2, with a cost of C i (e i ), as summarized in Assumption 1.
The model and results
Working as a team or partnership, the agents produce joint surplus v(e, s), where e = (e 1 , e 2 ). s is an index of team productivity; without loss of generality, s ∈ [0, 1]. There are two alternative investment timing regimes -simultaneous and sequential. With simultaneous investment, at date 0 the two agents choose their level of relationship-specific non-contractible effort. At date 1, the agents bargain over their share of gross surplus. With sequential investment the ex ante agent invests at date 0. Having observed this, the ex post agent makes her investment at date 1. At date 2, the agents bargain and the game ends.
Without loss of generality, each party receives a share B i (e, s), i = 1, 2, of the gross surplus generated, given that B 1 (e, s) + B 2 (e, s) = v(e, s) and the conditions outlined in Assumption 2.
As noted in the Introduction, Winter (2009) illustrates the possibility of IR when an increase in the payoffs (incentives) causes some agents to reduce their effort. In the framework presented here, IR arises if workers exert less effort as a result of being part of a more productive team.
Simultaneous case
The objective function for each agent in the simultaneous case is
(1)
The equilibrium levels of effort e(s) solve the following first-order conditions:
The solution for each agent's investment choice exists and is unique due to Assumptions 1 and 2. From this we derive our benchmark result -the conditions for IR with simultaneous investment.
Proposition 1. With simultaneous investment, for IR to hold:
∂e i ∂s < 0, for at least one i and some s ∈ [0, 1] is necessary; and
If the marginal return of effort for both agents is always increasing in productivity (s), there will never be IR -hence, a necessary condition for IR is that, for some s and at least one agent, their effort and the productivity level are not complementary. From Part 2, if efforts are complementary with one another
, the effort choices of team members move together. Consequently, if the marginal productivity of effort for both agents is decreasing in s
, it must be the case that in equilibrium both efforts fall with s. 4 While there are various specific cases around these conditions, we will highlight one when
∂e 2 ∂s ≥ 0. In this case, the marginal productivity of only effort e 1 is decreasing in s. If there is to be IR, the negative impact of s (directly via ∂ 2 B 1 (e,s) ∂e 1 ∂s < 0 for e 1 and through ∂ 2 B 1 (e,s) ∂e 1 ∂e 2 for e 2 ) in equilibrium needs to dominate its positive impact (directly via ∂ 2 B 2 (e,s) ∂e 2 ∂s ≥ 0 for e 2 and through ∂ 2 B 2 (e,s) ∂e 1 ∂e 2 for e 1 ). 5 Example 1 illustrates the possibility of IR with simultaneous investment.
Example 1
Assume that the joint surplus is v(e 1 , e 2 , s) = 3s(1 − e 1 − e 2 ) + 21(e 1 + e 2 ) − 80(e 3 1 + e 3 2 ). Each agent's effort cost is C i (e i ) = 9e i for i = 1, 2, and s ∈ [0, 1]. For simplicity, we assume 4 An equivalent scenario, when a change that improves overall productivity also being associated with a decrease in marginal returns, has been analyzed previously in the literature, for example see Bel (2013) and Bel et al. (2015) .
5 See the proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix.
that the shares for the two parties are B 1 (e, s) = B 2 (e, s) = v(e, s)/2. Using (2), the optimal efforts are e sim
The efforts are decreasing in the productivity level s -there is an IR. 6 It is worth noting several additional points. First, in our model IR can result in all agents decreasing their effort. This is not possible in Winter (2009) where IR can only hold for a subset of agents. Second, whilst IR in Winter (2009) relies on increasing returns with respect to agents' efforts, we make the usual assumption of diminishing returns to effort. Third, the mechanism underlying IR here is different from in Winter (2009) . IR in Winter (2009) arises from an agent's best-response choice to shirk in response to another agent's dominant strategy to invest in a discrete-choice setting; IR occurs here because the marginal return of effort for at least one agent is not aligned with overall team output. Taken together, our model shows that IR can occur in a broader range of circumstances than initially considered by Winter (2009).
Sequential case
Let us now consider the case when efforts are made sequentially by the two agents, which parallels the timing of investment in Winter (2009) . The objective function for ex ante agent in this case is A 1 (e 1 , s) = B 1 (e 1 , e 2 (e 1 ), s) − C 1 (e 1 ),
whilst the objective function of ex post agent is given by
where e 2 (e 1 ) is the ex post agent's best response to the choice of the ex ante agent at date 0. The equilibrium efforts e(s) solve the first-order conditions
where Y (e, s) = ∂B 1 (e, s) ∂e 2
∂e 2 2   6 Note Assumptions 1-2 are satisfied for effort levels e i ≤ e sim i . For higher effort levels we assume that alternative specific functional forms apply to ensure that the assumptions of the model are satisfied.
is the internalization effect introduced in Mai et al. (2014) . This effect captures how the ex ante agent strategically manipulates her effort, accounting for the ex post agent's response. To ensure uniqueness, we make the following additional assumption. 7 Assumption 3. The objective function of an ex ante agent (4) is strictly concave in e 1 .
The solution to (6) exists and is unique due to Assumptions 1-3. 
The intuition here is similar to the simultaneous case, with the additional complication that we need to take into account the internalization effect. If an increase in s enhances the net marginal return of effort for both the ex ante and ex post agent, there will never be IR; consequently, IR requires that the net impact of s on marginal return for at least one effort is negative, as outlined in Part 1. From Part 2, there will be IR if the net marginal return of effort for both agents is reduced by an increase in s when efforts are complementary (
. Again, it is possible to consider other cases. For example, suppose that the net marginal return of ex ante and ex post effort is declining and increasing in the productivity level s, respectively: that is, ∂ 2 B 1 (e,s) ∂e 1 ∂s + ∂Y (e,s) ∂s < 0 and ∂ 2 B 2 (e,s) ∂e 2 ∂s ≥ 0. In this instance, IR requires the negative influence of s, directly via ∂ 2 B 1 (e,s) ∂e 1 ∂s + ∂Y (e,s) ∂s < 0 for e 1 and through ∂ 2 B 1 (e,s) ∂e 1 ∂e 2 for e 2 , in equilibrium dominates its positive impact on marginal productivity, directly via ∂ 2 B 2 (e,s) ∂e 2 ∂s ≥ 0 for e 2 and through ∂ 2 B 2 (e,s) ∂e 1 ∂e 2 for e 1 . 8 One difference with the simultaneous case is worth mentioning: IR is possible with sequential investment even when the marginal return of effort for all agents is increasing with improvements in technology
provided that the ex ante agent's net marginal return is negative
. It is the presence of the internalization effect, captured here by ∂Y (e,s) ∂s , that makes this possible.
Example 2
Assume that the joint surplus is v(e 1 , e 2 , s) = (5.2 + 0.8s)(e 1 + e 2 ) + 0.8(1 − s)e 1 e 2 − (e 2 1 + e 2 2 ). Each agent's effort cost is C i (e i ) = 1.2e i for i = 1, 2. In addition, we assume that s ∈ [0, 1] and the shares for the two parties are B 1 (e, s) = B 2 (e, s) = v(e, s)/2. Note, Assumptions 1-3 are satisfied for e i ≤ 1. 9 From the simultaneous case FOC, investments are e sim 1 (s) = e sim 2 (s) = 7+2s 8+2s . Now consider the sequential investment. and e seq 2 (s) = 0.7 + 0.2s + 0.2(1 − s)e seq 1 (s). Both efforts are higher with the sequential regime rather than the simultaneous regime due to the positive internalization effect Y (e, s) = 0.24(1 − s), see Mai et al. (2014) . As e sim i (s) increases with productivity s, while the internalization effect decreases with productivity s, the combined effect on sequential investment could go either way. As we can see from Figure 1 , for s ≤ 0.5 both investments decrease with s because the decrease in the internalization effect dominates the increase in the simultaneous investment. On the other hand, for s > 0.5 only e seq 1 decreases with s, while in the case of ex post investment the increase in the simultaneous investment dominates the decrease due to the internalization effect. Note that when s = 1 the internalization effect is absent and all four investments are the same e sim i = e seq 1 = e seq 2 .
Appendix

Proof of Proposition 1
Applying the Implicit Function Theorem to the system of equations in (2) yields that equilibrium efforts exhibit IR iff: 
where i, j = 1, 2 and i ̸ = j. Combining (8) with Assumptions 1 and 2 proves the proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 2
Applying the Implicit Function Theorem to the system of equations in (6) Combining inequalities 9-10 with Assumptions 1 and 2 proves the proposition.
